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THE GATT, LAw AND INTERNATIONAL EcoNOMIC ORGANIZATION.
By Kenneth Dam. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 1970.
Pp. xvii, 480. $15.
WORLD TRADE AND THE LAW OF GATT. By John H. Jackson.
New York: Bobbs-Merrill. 1969. Pp. xl, 948. $27.50.
The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade,1 popularly known
as GATT, is the basic international instrument regulating imports
and exports of its seventy-six member countries, including the
United States. Recent events in this country have pointed up the
immediacy of the need to promote understanding of this vital document's main purpose-the liberalization of international trade.
These excellent books by Professors Dam and Jackson should prove
to be useful tools in this educative process.
On November 19, 1970, the House of Representatives passed
H.R. 18970, entitled "The Trade Act of 1970."2 This bill was reported by the Senate Finance Committee but had riot yet been acted
upon when the 91st Congress expired; it provided that the "total
quantity of each category of textile articles ... and the total quantity
of each category of footwear articles . . . produced in any foreign
country which may be entered in 1971 shall not exceed the average
annual quantity of such category produced in such country and
entered during 1967, 1968 and 1969."3 Annual quantitative limitations were provided for subsequent years as well,4 and the President
was granted authority to suspend the application of the import
quotas to any textile or footwear article, upon a determination that
imports of such article "are not contributing to, causing, or threatening to cause market disruption in the United States." 5
In addition to these mandatory quotas, the proposed bill authorized the United States Tariff Commission to recommend not only
tariff increases, but quantitative restrictions, if it determined that
the latter were necessary to prevent further imports from contributing "substantially ... toward causing or threatening to cause serious injury to ... domestic industry ..•." 6 In order to exercise this
discretionary power, the Commission would have been required to
make two findings: first, it would have had to determine that the
imported article undersold the domestic article, constituted "an increasing proportion of apparent domestic consumption," and was
1. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A3 (1947),
T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter GATT].
2. H.R. 18970, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970).
3. H.R. 18970, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. § 201(a) (1970).
4. H.R. 18970, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. § 20l(b) (1970).
5. H.R. 18970, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. § 201(d) (1970).
6. H.R. 18970, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. § lll(a) [proposed § 30l(b){l)J (1970). Section 111
of H.R. 18970 contains a proposed amendment of § 301 of the Trade Expansion Act of
1962, 19 u.s.c. § 1901 (1964).
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produced at unit labor costs substantially below those of the domes•
tic article; 7 second, the Commission would have had to ascertain
either that domestic production and employment were declining
substantially or that import penetration "constitute[d] more than
15% of apparent United States consumption" and was increasing
"by at least 3 percentage points ...." 8
Congressional enactment of these provisions would have violated
the obligations of the United States under GATT. Indeed, GATT
contains a general prohibition of quantitative restrictions,11 a prohibition that, ironically, was inserted in response to American pressure.
Professor Dam quotes one of the chief American negotiators, Clair
Wilcox, who said that "quantitative restrictions are among the most
effective methods that have been devised for the purpose of restricting trade."10 Professor Jackson notes that the longest and most difficult preparatory negotiations concerned the efforts to dismantle
quotas,ll which the United States condemned as rigid political devices that ignore consumer demand and are thus more harmful than
the restrictionism of the I930's.12 Both authors emphasize that quotas
have a much more stifling effect on trade than do tariffs.18
It is true that the GATT prohibition of quotas is subject to certain exceptions; 14 the most important of these are "Restrictions to
Safeguard the Balance of Payments,''15 which both authors discuss in
some detail.16 Briefly, quotas may be used when necessary "to forestall the imminent threat of, or to stop, a serious decline in ... monetary reserves" of the importing country, or "in the case of a contracting party with very low monetary reserves, to achieve a reasonable
rate of increase in its reserves." 17 Obviously, the quota provisions of
the proposed trade bill could not have been justified under these
clauses of GATT; indeed, the report of the House Committee on
Ways and Means refers to the unfavorable United States balance of
payments and to the declining balance of trade without even raising
the question whether the proposed quotas could be reconciled with
7. H.R. 18970, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. § lll(a) [proposed § 30l(b)(5)(C}] (1970).
8. H.R. 18970, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. § lll(a) [proposed § 30l(b)(5)(A)] (1970).
9. GATT art. XI, para. 1.
10. K. DAM, THE GATT, LAW AND !NTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION 148
(1970) [hereinafter DAM].
11. J. JACKSON, WORLD TRADE AND THE LAW OF GATr 307 (1969) [hereinafter JAC!C•
SON].

12. JACKSON at 310.
13. DAM at 148-49; JACKSON at 306.
14. GATT art. XI, para. 2, allows member states to enact import restrictions on
agricultural or fisheries products when such restrictions are necessary to enforce domestic legislation limiting production; the U.S. has such legislation. For details, see
JACKSON at 316-21.
15. GATT art. XII.
16. DAM at 151-57; JACKSON at 681-87.
17. GATT art. XII, para. 2(a).
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GATT.18 Consequently, our principal trading partners in GATT
could have claimed "nullification or impairment" of their rights
pursuant to article XXIII of the treaty.19 Thus, the threats of widespread retaliation against American exports in the event that the
trade bill should become law20 may have a sound legal foundation.
This threat of a trade war, widely echoed in the press,21 was probably
the most powerful reason for the Senate's inaction. Such a war would
have had serious adverse effects on our balance of trade and thereby
would have damaged our balance-of-payments position; these results
would be directly opposite to those expected by the bill's proponents.
In short, passage of the Trade Act of 1970 would have compelled this
reviewer to compose an obituary of the institution so brilliantly explored by our nvo authors.
Although at this writing-January 1971-new trade bills with
the same quota provisions have been introduced,22 there are indications that the assault on GATT may not be resumed. Indeed, Congressman Mills, Chairman of the House Committee on Ways and
Means and author of the trade bill, stated in the closing days of the
91st Congress that quotas would not be needed if the United States
and Japan could come to an agreement on textiles.23 Perhaps we can
expect international arrangements comparable either to the informal
understandings with Germany and Japan concerning voluntary cutbacks in imports of steel24 or to the existing Long Term Arrangement on Cotton Textiles, which was negotiated within the framework of GATT and which permits, unaer specified conditions,
import restrictions to avert market disruption.25 In any event, Mr.
Mills seems now to recognize that even so powerful a country as ours
should try to avoid unilateral tampering with international trade,
and that acceptable solutions of the problems in this field must be
found by international negotiations. Hence, the abortive Trade Bill
of 1970 has enormously increased the timeliness and usefulness of
the study of GATT by our authors.
18. H.R. REP. No. 1435, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 12-15 (1970).
19. JACKSON at 182.
20. See Keefe, "Made in Japan" Fuels the Antitrust Furnace, 55 A.B.A.J. 1214,
1215-15 (1971):
The real loser by this bill is the American farmer who uses one of every five
of his acres to produce for overseas consumption, because Japan ••• can shift
its purchases to Australia and Canada. The European Economic Community
would like nothing better than to shut off the $500 million annual trade in
American soybeans used for margerine. • • • Ralf Dohrendorf, the Common
Market's Commissioner for Foreign Commerce, • • • stated that if the United
States imposes quotas • • • , the EEC would • • • take steps for equivalent
retaliation.
21. E.g., Wall St. J., Oct. 14, 1970, at 1, col. 1.
22. S. 4 &: H.R. 20, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971).
23. Wall St. J., Dec. 30, 1970, at 3, col. 2.
24. C. FULDA &: W. SCHWARTZ, REGULATION OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND lNvEsTMENT 255 (1970).
25. For a detailed account, see DAM at 300-09.
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The difference in length of the two books-Jackson's is twice as
long as Dam's-does not reflect a difference in quality, which is extraordinarily high in both cases. Professor Jackson's treatise is a detailed and exhaustive analysis of every provision of GATT. The text
is interspersed with valuable ancillary information-including a list
of all waivers granted by the contracting parties,26 a catalogue of all
practices that have been considered subsidies,27 and a compilation of
all regional arrangements notified to GATT; 28 the book also supplies detailed data on all relevant tariff schedules, protocols, and
agreements, as well as bibliographical references. 29 In short, those
who wish to penetrate deeply into every corner of the complicated
GATT language must have the Jackson book. Professor Dam's work,
on the other hand, is a succinct survey of the same field; it is indispensable for those who need a concise, illuminating treatment of all
of the important problems but who do not wish to work through a
more detailed elaboration.
The central feature of GATT is the commitment of the parties
to limit tariffs on imports of specific goods. Concessions, which are
called "bindings," are negotiated through tariff bargaining, and these
concessions are generalized among member states through the treaty's
most-favored-nation clause and through its prohibition of discriminatory treatment.30 The enforcement of this system is described by Professor Dam in a particularly felicitous passage31 in which he notes
that "... domestic contract law and public international law are
more concerned with assuring that commitments made are carried
out than with promoting the making of agreements in the first
place," while GATT " ... has a special interest in seeing that as
many agreements for the reduction of tariffs as possible are made."82
If withdrawal of a "binding" were forbidden, the making of such
concessions would be discouraged. Therefore, the principal treaty
sanction for an increase of a tariff in violation of a previous concession is the right of retaliation; injured and interested parties may
respond to a violation by suspending concessions they have previously granted to the offending party. 88 This scheme is preferable to
less flexible enforcement mechanisms because, as Professor Dam
convincingly explains, "[i]t is better, for example, that 100 commitments should be made and that IO should be withdrawn than that
only 50 commitments should be made and that all of them should
26. JACKSON at 549-52.
27. JACKSON at 885.
28. JACKSON at 592-98.
29. JACKSON at 888-916.
80. JACKSON at 29, 768-64.
SI. DAM at 79-81.
82, DAM at 80,
SS. GATI' arts. XXIll, XXVIII.
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be kept." 8' Thus, "retaliation," a self-help type of device generally
frowned upon in domestic law, is, "[subject] to established procedures and kept within prescribed bounds, ... made the heart of the
GATT system."35 Retaliation works and will continue to work so
long as the parties find that continued adherence to the GATT tariff system furthers their mutual interests.36
Insofar as quotas are concerned, we see a different picture. Quotas, as noted above, are more pernicious than tariffs, but the GATT's
balance-of-payments exception37 encourages inflation-ridden countries to adopt quotas rather than tariffs. Professor Dam notes that
many countries have kept quotas even after their balance-ofpayments position has vastly improved, and that a list of such presently illegal quotas, primarily involving agricultural products, fills
over 100 pages.38 It follows, then-as both authors note 39-that the
GATT's regulation of quotas and other nontariff barriers has proved
less satisfactory than that of tariffs.
Emergency withdrawal of tariff bindings is explicitly permitted
under article XIX of GATT, the so-called escape clause.40 This
adjustment mechanism is designed to afford temporary relief-usually in the form of a tariff increase-to a country whose producers
are threatened with serious injury from increased imports resulting
from tariff concessions. Both authors discuss article XIX, 41 but Professor Dam does not mention the United States domestic law on the
subject, and Professor Jackson devotes only one page to it.42 Jackson
does note that the 1962 Trade Expansion Act'3 added, for the first
time, the remedy of adjustment assistance-by way of direct payments, technical and tax assistance, retraining programs, and the
like-for firms injured and workers made jobless by imports. He
also observes that the requirements for escape-clause relief were
"tightened" by the 1962 Act and that "few if any applications" for
relief under that Act have been granted.44 In fact, no application for
escape-clause relief or adjustment assistance under the Trade Expansion Act has been successful because the Tariff Commission has con34.
35.

DAM
DAM

at 80.
at 81.

36. Professor Jackson's proposals for a new International Trade Institution, which
may consist of a "mandatory code" and an "optional code," do not seem to contain
anything that would be preferable to the GATT retaliation system. See JACKSON at
780-85.

37. See notes 15-17 supra and accompanying text.
88. DAM at 165-66.
39. DAM at 166; JACKSON at 519. Conceivably, Congress might have attempted to
justify the trade bill quotas as retaliation for the illegal quotas of other contracting
parties. but this approach was not taken.
40. Emergency Action on Imports of Particular Products, GATT art. XIX.
41. DAM at 99-107; JACKSON at 553-73.
42. JACKSON at 566-67.
43. 19 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1991 (1964), as amended, (Supp. V, 1965-1969).
44. JACJtSON at 567.
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strued the language of that Act45 in such a way as to preclude the possibility of affirmative recommendations for relief.46 Beginning in
November 1969, too late for inclusion in either book, a new majority
of the Commission, reversing previous interpretations of the 1962
Act, granted petitions for adjustment assistance to firms and workers
in several cases,47 and for industry-wide escape-clause relief in two
cases.48 This development is of crucial importance; the practical impossibility of obtaining relief in the United States was inconsistent
with the philosophy of article XIX of GATT, which recognizes the
necessity of an internal-adjustment mechanism in cases in which real
hardship can be traced to the liberalization of import policies. The
situation in the United States prior to November 1969 was all the
more regrettable because individual-adjustment assistance for firms
and workers is more consistent with the policies underlying GATT
than is industry-wide tariff relief under the escape clause. The latter
withdraws previous concessions and thus interferes with international reciprocity, possibly setting in motion retaliating increases; the
former compensates individual victims of the national policy of free
trade. The new interpretation of the Trade Expansion Act by the reconstituted membership of the United States Tariff Commission thus
makes available a safety valve against pressures for protectionist legislation, thereby strengthening the GATT system.
A close interrelationship between GATT and domestic law exists, of course, in other areas as well. Perhaps most noteworthy is the
antidumping law enacted in the United States in 1921,49 a quarter of
a century before the enactment of GATT, which deals briefly with
45. The Tariff Commission must find that " .•• as a result in major part of concessions granted under trade agreements, an article is being imported • • • in such
increased quantities as to cause, or threaten to cause, serious injury to [a] ••• domestic
industry •• .'' (19 U.S.C. § 190l(b)(l) (1964) (emphasis added)). ", •• [I]ncreased im•
ports shall be considered to cause ••• serious injury ••• when the Tariff Commission
finds that such increased imports have been the major factor in causing • • • such injury •• .'' (19 U.S.C. § 190l(b)(3) (1964) (emphasis added)).
46. For details, see C. FULDA &: W. ScmVARTZ, supra note 24, at 399-415, and the
sources cited therein.
47. Hoy, Adjustment Assistance Under the Trade Expansion Act: A Critique of
Recent Tariff Commission Decisions, 6 TEXAS INTL. L.F. 67 (1970). In addition to the
cases cited by Hoy, the Commission recommended relief in at least three cases brought
by firms-Barbers Chairs and Parts Thereof, T.C. Pub. No. 320, April 1970; Women's
and Misses' Dress Shoes, T.C. Pub. No. 323, June 1970; Certain Woven Fabrics, T.C,
Pub. No. 342, November 1970-and five cases brought by individual workers-Plastic- or Rubber-Soled Footwear, T.C. Pub. No. 321, April 1970; Piano Actions, T.C,
Pub. No. 331, July 1970; Protective Footwear of Rubber or Plastics, T.C, Pub. No. 330,
July 1970; Stainless Steel Table Flatware, T.C. Pub. No. 347; Silver-Plated and
Staiuless-Steel Table Holloware, T.C. Pub. No. 348, December 1970.
48. Pianos and Parts Thereof, T.C. Pub. No. 309, December 1969; Proclamation 3964,
Modification of Trade Agreement Concession and Adjustment of Duty on Certain
Pianos, 35 Fed. Reg. 3645 (1970). In Nonrubber Footwear, T.C. Pub. No. 359, at 24a,
January 1971, the Commission recommended by an equally divided vote an increase
of duties "by a modest amount on a few key categories of imported footwear.'' Note
the contrast with mandatory quotas!
49. Antidumping Act, 1921, 19 U.S.C. §§ 160-73 (1964).
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this same subject in article VI. In 1967, as a part of the Kennedy
Round, the GATT members agreed on an elaborate antidumping
code,irn which elaborates in considerable detail substantive and procedural rules with regard to the imposition of antidumping duties.
This code was ratified by the legislatures of numerous signatories,
but was not even submitted to the United States Congress. Both authors, in discussing the code,51 fail to give sufficient attention to the
controversy within the Tariff Commission concerning the code's consistency with American law,52 nor do they adequately deal with the
United States statute that directs the Tariff Commission to "resolve
any conflict between the International Antidumping Code and the
Antidumping Act, 1921, in favor of the Act as applied by the agency
administering the Act ...." 53 Indeed, the Tariff Commission has not
mentioned the code in the increasing number of antidumping cases
that have recently been brought to it for decision. The relevant domestic law that impinges on particular provisions of GATT should
not be so neglected.
Perhaps it should be added that the authors might have improved
their treatments of the GATT dispute settlement procedure 54 by including more detailed discussions of case studies of particular disputes.55
We may conclude that the two books under review are impressive
and most useful achievements. They enrich and deepen our understanding of the complicated problems of world trade at a time when
the strongest protectionist movement in decades, one which may have
suffered only a temporary setback by the defeat of the 1970 trade bill,
makes such enlightenment more necessary than ever before. A
healthy economic world order cannot be achieved by torpedoing the
GATT machinery. Instead, GATT-along with other international
organizations, imperfect and incomplete as they are-should be
strengthened and expanded. In short, "[t]he primary goal of policy
should be expansion, not contraction, of trade.'' 56 Professors Dam
and Jackson have shown the way.

Carl H. Fulda,
Hugh Lamar Stone Professor of Law,
The University of Texas
50. Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade, CATT Doc. L/2812 app. C (1967), set out in full in JACKSON at
426-38.
51. DAM at 167-77; JACKSON at 401-38.
52. See C. FULDA &: W. SCHWARTZ, supra note 24, at 449-50, 454-60.
53. Renegotiation Amendments Act of 1968, P.L. No. 90-634, § 20l(a)(l), 82 Stat.
1345.
54. See, particularly, DAM at 351-73.
55. See Hudec, The CATT Legal System: A Diplomat's Jurisprudence, 4 J. WORLD
TltADE L. 615, 636-65 (1970).
56, First National City Bank of New York, Monthly Letter, Oct. 1970, at 119.

